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6.1 Introduction 
Income-contingent loan programs run by governments represent an impor-
tant social innovation1 an improvement over previous mechanisms for funding 
investment such as education and now showing its merits in a host of other are-
nas. This paper, and the other papers presented in this session, lay out the theory 
of income-contingent loans and describe experiences witl1 this type of program 
in education and other areas. 
Income-contingent loans are a response to long-standing imperfections in risk 
and capital markets, themselves a consequence of information imperfections, 
which lead to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, as well as costly 
contract enforcement. 
Current arrangements for student loans illustrate the deficie11cies of the pre-
vailing financial mechanisms: individuals can only borrow limited amounts. The 
obligations are fixed, irrespective of individuals' ability to repay. The result is that 
many individuals face undue hardship: there are a large number of unforeseen 
and unforeseeable events. An individual may receive training for a job for which 
he is not well suited. He may receive training for an occupation that is dying. 
Or with the episodic downturns that have afflicted capitalism from the begin-
ning, he may find himself unemployed for an extended period of time; typically, 
unemployment insurance replaces only a small fraction of the income that he 
normally would have received. 
Moreover1 transactions costs are significant. Some of the transactions costs are 
simply those associated with screening loan applicants and collecting what is 
owed. But even here1 markets unnecessarily increase costs. Each lender looks for 
individuals who are "overpriced," that is, who are willing to borrow at an interest 
rate that exceeds that which would compensate it for tbe risk of default and other 
costs of the loan; and attempts to foist onto other individuals who are under-
priced. Imperfections of competition, typical of markets in which information 
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is imperfect and asymmetric, lead to high margins, and thus to large expendi-
tures on marketing. Finally, for for-profit lenders, transactions costs - the spread 
between the costs of funds and what they receive on loans - are a good thing; 
they are the source of profits. They strive to make this kind of transactions costs 
as large as possible, inducting through discriminatory lending practices and loan 
complexity. 
We know what the economy would look like with perfect information and 
costless enforcement. There would be perfect interstate and intertemporal 
smoothing. Individuals would be essentially indifferent between whether a bad 
state (say, unemployment) occurred or a good state.2 The marginal utility of 
consumption of individuals at each date and state would be esse11tially the same, 
too. 
But with moral hazard, there will be imperfect interstate smoothing. But 
imperfect smoothing of future risks leads to imperfect intertemporal smooth-
ing: Lenders worry that the borrower won't have resources to repay. So too, the 
borrower worries that with a conventional loan, there will be large variability in 
future consumption, resulting in hardship. This will limit the amount of debt 
that individuals are willing to undertake. 
This, in turn, has important consequences. There can be significant underin-
vestment in education (relative to what would have occurred in a perfect market). 
There will be lower levels of job search, since individuals would have to borrow 
excessively to continue looking for a job that better matched their skills. That is, 
they accept early job offers rather than continue to search for a better match. 
Moreover, there will be a high level of consumption volatility (both across 
states and periods), at least relative to the first-best level. 
Income-contingent loans represent a compromise. The standard income-
contingent loan entails limiting repayments to a maximum percentage of the 
individual's income, with the repayment spread over a longer period of time. 
Typically, there is also a limit to the number of years of repayment. 
Thus1 when future income is moderately low1 the burden of payment is spread 
out over more years - there is better intertemporal smoothing. If capital mar-
kets were perfect - if there were no credit rationing - this might not matter 
much. Individuals could simply borrow. But there is credit rationing, and so 
this intertemporal smoothing can matter a great deal. 
Note that in this case, there is no attenuation of incentives. Since the individ-
ual pays back in full what is owed - payments are simply stretched out over a 
longer period of time - there is no incentive for individuals to shirk. Indeed, the 
fact that consumption risk has been lowered increases welfare, and, as we noted 
earlier, because the risk of borrowing has in effect been reduced, efficiency of 
investment (in education and job search) has increased. 3 
When there is a risk of a large reduction in future income1 then there 
is some chance that individuals will not repay what is owed. Then, the 
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income-contingent loan achieves some degree of interstate smoothing. As in 
the case with any insurance, there can be adverse incentive effects - individu-
als may not take as much action to protect against insured events and to make 
sure that the events do not occur as they could/should. But there can, as before, 
be positive incentive effects: the risks of investments in education or job search 
are reduced, and this leads to more efficient investment - a level of investment 
that is closer to that which would have occurred had there been perfect markets. 
Even with potential future disincentive effects, some level of interstate smooth-
ing is desirable, that is, it is desirable to have an income-contingent loan program 
with some limits on the repayment period, so that if the individual faces a really 
bad state of nature (a long period of unemployment), he does not bear the entire 
brunt of the bad luck. The access to funds with some risk sharing increases both 
efficiency and equity. 
But this is not the only reason for income-contingent loans. There are several 
reasons, in particular, for government-provided income-contingent loans. (Inter-
estingly, the private sector has not on its own developed these superior financial 
instruments, partly for reasons that the following discussion will make clear.) 
First, government-provided income-contingent loans allow taking advantage 
of economies of scope in the government's collection of taxes, which reduces the 
cost of enforcement, and increases the effectiveness of enforcement. (Moreover, 
in the case of loan programs, like mortgages, where an essential piece of infor-
mation in determining an individual's creditworthiness is previous income, the 
government has, by definition, the best access to the relevant information. Typ-
ically, private borrowers simply take a printout of the individual's past returns1 
and then reenter the data into their loan evaluation programs.) 
Secondly, as we have already noted, whenever there are information asymme-
tries (and there almost always are such asymmetries), private firms attempt to 
engage in /1 cherry picking," lending to good or overpriced risks1 with great costs 
to society- and large transaction costs. In general, the utilitarian optimum can-
not be attained,4 and, in general, the equilibrium (if it exists) is not even Pareto 
efficient (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). 
Thirdly, as Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) noted, whenever there are informa-
tion asymmetries1 there are (pecuniary) externalities that matter which can take 
on a variety of forms: there are cross-market and cross-instrument externalities; 
that is, actions in one market have effects on others, and the use of one instru-
ment has effects on others. For instance, governments raise money through 
the tax system; but the amount of money raised depends on the investments 
in education, and the terms at which student loans are available affects those 
investments, and thus tax revenues. But private -markets, in deciding the terms 
of student loans, do not take into account the impacts on government tax rev-
enues. A government-run student loan program could and should do so. As we 
note below, loans to help individuals manage a period of unemployment affect 
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job search (then and possibly in later periods), and thus expenditures under the 
unemployment insurance program. 
Finally, as the recent crisis has shown, the financial sector has developed con-
siderable expertise in exploiting especially those who are financially unsophisti-
cated. While there has long been the hope that regulation could circumscribe at 
least the most blatant forms of such exploitation, the evidence is that the regu-
lations have not sufficed (partly because of the influence of the financial sector 
in watering down the regulation, and partly because of their success in getting 
regulators appointed who do not believe in regulation). While public lending 
may suffer from other problems, it does not seem to suffer from this. The incen-
tives for abuse of income-contingent loans simply do not exist within the public 
sector as compared to the private sector. 
As noted earlier1 student loans have been the main area where income-
contingent loans have been used. While Australia has experienced remarkable 
success with its income-contingent loan program1 5 conventional loans in the US 
and some other countries have been a disaster. They have imposed enormous 
hardship on the poor, discouraged them (and increasingly even the children 
of middle income Americans) from investing in education, leading to more 
inequality and less socioeconomic mobility. The huge buildup of debt (now, in 
the aggregate, greater than credit card debt and exceeding $1 trillion) is having 
macroeconomic consequences. Of course1 matters have been made worse by the 
provisions of the bankruptcy law, making it almost impossible for students to 
discharge this debt, even in bankruptcy.6 
But in the second part of this paper, I want to focus on the use of income-
contingent loar1s for managing the risks of unemployment. 
6.2 Unemployment and income-contingent loans7 
Unemployment seems to impose real hardship on individuals. There is limited 
unemployment insurance - limited in both duration and the fraction of the 
income lost that is replaced. The standard explanation is the worry about moral 
hazard. Making matters worse is the fact that individuals can1t borrow to smooth 
consumption. 
Most bouts of unemployment are small. If individuals could borrow agalnst 
future income (for example1 out of their retirement account), the costs of a short 
spell of unemployment would be low; individuals could easily smooth consump-
tion over time. The advantage of allowing for full smoothing in this way is that 
there would be no adverse incentive (moral hazard): individuals' decisions, for 
example, about job search, would be totally unaffected. 
But what happens if the individual faces repeated spells of unemployment? 
Then there can be lifetime shocks, that is1 depending on the number of episodes 
of unemployment, individuals' lifetime income may be lowered significantly. 
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There then needs to be some insurance. But even then, insurance should be com-
plemented by loans; and this is true despite the possibility of a loan default and 
the corresponding disincentive effects. (That is, if the individual borrows when 
he is young to smooth out his income - assuming that he will be unemployed 
only for a limited time - and then faces a run of bad luck, he may not be able to 
repay the loan. The knowledge that he can default on his loan might attenuate 
his incentives for search.) 
In a sense, any loan program which allows an individual to (partially or totally) 
default if he has a run of bad luck can be thought of as a form of income-
contingent loan. One can design systems with more or less income contingency. 
A non-income-contingent loan would force the individual to repay the loan, say 
out of his retirement income, even if the result was to force him into poverty in 
retirement. A more income-contingent loan would provide a high threshold of 
protection in retirement, no matter how bad his fortune. 
Income-contingent loans can be thought of as a limited form of "human cap-
ital equity" - there is some risk sharing, srnoothing not only over time but also 
across states. One can show that income-contingent loans are preferable to con-
ventiollal loans - that is, the optimal program entails some income contingency. 
One can show that, in general, the optimal unemployment program consists of a 
package of loans and insurance, in which there is some insurance, complemented 
by income-contingent loans. This is true despite the possibility of loan default 
and the corresponding disincentive effects. 
The most complicated part of the analysis of the optimal unemployment 
program arises from the existence of cross-market, intertemporal, and cross-
instrument externalities. Providing loans, whether income-contingent or con-
ventional, affects job search, which in turn impacts government losses on 
unemployment insurance. Providing loans in the first period in the event of 
unemployment affects job search in later periods. 
By the same token, providing better unemployment insurance affects job 
search, which thereby affects 11losses11 in income-contingent loan program. Pro-
viding unemployment insurance in later periods affects job search in earlier 
periods. 
There are also important externalities extending from the private sector to 
the public and vice versa1 but there is one difference. In principle, the gov-
ernment should take account of the impacts its actions have on others, while 
the private sector does not. There are1 for instance, important externalities from 
private decisions to public insurance and loan programs: (unobservable) private 
savings affects search behavior, and therefore losses on government insurance 
and income-contingent loan programs. If the government could restrict precau-
tionary savings, it would; but in practice, not only is the level of savings hard 
to monitor, it is even more difficult to differentiate such precautionary savings 
from other savings. 
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There is another set of externalities, which we refer to as peer monitoring 
externalities. If peers have informational advantage over, say, the government 
and can exert peer pressure1 for example, concerning search behavior1 then there 
can exist an equilibrium with co-signing, and a system with co-signing leads to 
a Pareto improvement. 
While the full analysis of the optimal unemployment system (the optimal 
combination of insurance and income-contingent loans, and the optimal design 
of the income-contingent loan program) is complicated, there are some general 
principles. Unlike existing programs, the optimal unemployment program varies 
with age and history. Unsurprisingly, the extent of insurance or loans depends 
on search elasticities (the sensitivity of search to the provision of insurance). Cor-
relations betvveen unemployment in different periods are also important: With a 
high correlation, it is more likely that there will be a large loss, and externalities 
across periods and instruments may be more significant. 
Most importantly from the perspective of this paper, there are real benefits 
to having a better unell!ployment program, and such a program should include 
an income-contingent loan program. There are significant welfare gains from 
better intertemporal smoothing - from the improved spreading and sharing of 
risks, which results in better interstate smoothing; and from the greater effi-
ciency in job search. Individuals will be willing to continue to search to find a 
better match, with greater productivity. Finally, there are benefits from greater 
transactional efficiency - from the lowering of the costs of administration. 
In short, unemployment is another important arena where appropriately 
designed income-conti11gent loans can be an important part of the policy mix, 
improving societal well-being and economic efficiency. 
Notes 
1. University Professor, Columbia University. This is a revised version of a paper 
originally presented at an !EA/World Bank Roundtable on Shared Prosperity, 
Jordan, June, 2014, and part of a special session on Income-Contingent Loans, 
reporting on some of the results of an earlier International Economic Associa-
tion Roundtable on Income-Contingent Loans, the proceedings of which are 
available as Chapman et al. (2014). See the papers in that volume for refer-
ences to the relevant literature upon which this paper was based. (See also the 
introduction and summary in that volume.) The work reported here focuses in 
particular on joint work with Jungyoll Yun on the use of income-contingent 
loans for unemployment. I am deeply indebted to him, to the participants in 
the earlier Bangkok Roundtable on income-contingent loans, and above all 
to Bruce Chapman and Timothy Higgins for organizing both the Roundtable 
and the session in which this paper was presented. 
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2. This is not quite accurate: perfect insurance equates the relevant marginal 
utilities. Whether individuals are indifferent to different states depends on 
the level of utility they enjoy in that state. 
3. The effects on the equilibrium level of say education can be more ambiguous. 
Assume a three period model, where the individual max U(w0 - E + B) + 
E U(p1 E - ri B) + E U(pz E - rz B) where Pi is the return on education in the 
ith period and If is the interest rate paid. The first order conditions are EU' o = 
EU'ir1 + EU12r2 and EU10 = EU'1P1 + EU12p2, and can be solved for Band E. 
The effect on, say, E of better intertemporal smoothing depends on U'". 
4. See Stiglitz and Yun (2013a). 
5. Chapman and Hunter (2009) and Chapman (2010). 
6. See Stiglitz (2012, 2015). 
7. This section is based on joint work with Jungyoll Yun, in particular Stiglitz 
and Yun (2013b, 2014). It follows on earlier work (Stiglitz and Yun, 2005) 
attempting to analyze how insurance and loans can and should be combined 
to protect against unemployment in ways 'iVhich minimize adverse effects on 
incentives. 
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